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**УСТОЙЧИВОЕ РАЗВИТИЕ ЭКОНОМИКИ:
МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ И НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ АСПЕКТЫ**

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Устойчивое развитие экономики: международные и национальные аспекты
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Рассмотрены демографические и миграционные процессы в контексте устойчивого развития экономики; обозначены теоретические основы, практические аспекты управления человеческими ресурсами; выявлены и систематизированы драйверы инклюзивного экономического роста в Беларуси и за рубежом; раскрыты актуальные финансовые и экономические аспекты развития отраслей; приведены актуальные проблемы и тенденции развития логистики на современном этапе; отражены современные тенденции совершенствования финансово-кредитного механизма; освещены актуальные проблемы учета, анализа, аудита в контексте устойчивого развития национальных и зарубежных экономических систем; представлены новейшие научные исследования различных аспектов функционирования современных коммуникативных технологий.

Для научных работников, докторантов, аспирантов, действующих практиков и студентов учреждений высшего образования, изучающих экономические дисциплины.

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THE MASS-MEDIA, PUBLIC OPINION AND CREATION OF THE AUTOCEPHALOUS ORTHODOX CHURCH OF UKRAINE

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On 15 December 2018, bishops of the Kiev Patriarchate (KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) assembled in the St Sophia Church in Kiev, in order to give start to a new Church structure in Ukraine. This event, called the Uniting Council, was presided over by Metropolitan Emmanuel (Adamakis), hierarch of the Ecumenical (Constantinople) Patriarchate. The composition of the Council reflected the roles and proportional significance of the Churches which took part in it. There were 42 bishops from the KP and 12 from the UAOC (plus accompanying priests and laypeople; however, only hierarchs were given the right to vote in the elections for the head of this new Church). The presence of the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, who was sitting in the presidium among the Church hierarchs, was particularly notable: this was a clear reflection of the head of state's role in the autocephalic process. Although various sources predicted that there would be quite a sizeable presence of the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), reality sharply differed from this prediction: only two hierarchs (out of 97) attended this Council, and even their formal membership of the UOC on the day of the Council later became questionable. The founding of the new Church, which received the name of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), was the outcome of a chain of events, that followed the April 2018 request from Petro Poroshenko to the Patriarch in Istanbul.

In this paper, I shall analyse how and in what context the creation of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine was proceeding. The particular attention is devoted to the constructing of what Stuart Croft called the "radical other" [2] and a further polarization of Ukrainian society, as a consequence of the Kiev's official policies and mass-media attitudes, prevailing at the process of establishment of a new Church.

Political-religious initiative

The 2018 autocephalic initiative was, to an extent, quite a unique enterprise. Indeed, it was a joint political-religious undertaking, since the President's request was accompanied by the signatures of the bishops of Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. The request was submitted in a time of extreme tensions between Ukraine and Russia, with the latter labeled by Ukrainian Parliament as an "aggressor state". Also, the post-Maidan Ukrainian political elites have reached a high degree of mutual agreement in their quest for autocephaly of the Orthodox Church. However, the absence of the UOC in this quest was obvious: only a handful of its priests have publicly supported the move towards autocephaly. This was especially meaningful in view of the fact that this Church has kept the largest number of Orthodox faithful in Ukraine.

The autocephalic initiative followed, as has been noted, "the substantial preparatory work", and certainly came at the right time for Poroshenko. Indeed, on the eve of 2019 elections and in the view of his declining popularity, the actions to promote autocephaly could

become the decisive method by which Poroshenko increased his popular support and his chances of re-election. As was admitted by Cyril Hovorun, Poroshenko needed “some sort of breakthrough ... in the period when the country enters the electoral cycle” [4]. Although some observers believed that the 2018 appeal for autocephaly would be as failing as the previous ones, the reality turned to be sharply different: the Ecumenical Patriarch took decisive actions to meet this request from Kiev. The attempts from the Moscow Patriarchate to somehow influence Constantinople’s approach did not succeed: even the personal visit of Patriarch Cyril to Istanbul on 31 August 2018 and his negotiations with Bartholomeos did not alter the latter’s perspectives. Constantinople’s decisions were straightforward and decisive; these were coming amid the protests from the UOC, which raised its voice against the Presidential-backed push towards autocephaly and unilateral interference from Istanbul in Ukrainian religious life.

Confrontation and intimidation

The UOC has already entered into a path of ordeal for its non-conformist perspective. In fact, this Church became the subject to unprecedented intimidation campaigns soon after the Maidan forces gained power in 2014. In principle, the Ukrainian mass-media has never been sympathetic towards the UOC, but this degree of antipathy varied [5]. The first strong negativity against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was revealed in the early 1990s, when the non-canonical Churches as well as the Greek Catholics were actively forming their new structures in Ukraine. Indeed, as Metropolitan Antony (Pakanich), chancellor of the UOC admitted, comparing the present-day situation with the events which occurred more than 25 years ago, “there was something similar in the 1990s: Churches were captured, priests were thrown out, believers were persecuted”. But difference was also observed: even in the 1990s, which began the years of the post-Soviet ordeal for the UOC, “there was no such an amount of lies against the Church, which we have observed now”. As can be seen from the opinion of Metropolitan Antony, the information attacks against the UOC have climbed to unprecedented levels [6. P.1-2].

In fact, what was happening in Ukraine since 2014 in relation towards the UOC, was the creation of what Croft described as the “other” or even “radical other” [2]. The UOC has always been a part of Ukrainian society, embracing people of different political and ideological views. Hovorun claims that two Ukrainian Presidents—Kuchma and Yanukovich supported UOC; while Kravchuk and Yushchenko were extending their support to the Kiev Patriarchate. However, the deliberate construction of an image of an enemy, as radicalized as it is portrayed today, has never occurred in the history of independent Ukraine. The accusations, made against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, have been persistent, strong and radical, involving current relations between Ukraine and Russia, the military conflict in the Donbas and the secession of Crimea in 2014. In fact, these accusations have been extremely political, with the use of language which can only be regarded as hate speech and with speculations which are not only hard to prove but are also hard to believe. The Church is accused of being a fifth column in Ukraine, of acting in a manner not compatible with the interests of the state and Ukrainian people. It is depicted as a “Kremlin organisation”, which initiated (or contributed to the beginning of) the war in Ukraine, which aims to undermine Ukrainian

sovereignty and acts against the independent Ukrainian state. The actions of the Church are often interpreted in the worst possible manner; sometimes ‘facts’ are simply invented, in order to prove the statements which would have looked implausible otherwise. According to Oleg Denisov, negative information about the UOC has been on the rise: since 2015 there were about 700 negative and intimidating publications in various mass-media [3]. In this context, the reasoning of archbishop Kliment Vecheria, head of the Information Department of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, is quite understandable:

For the whole period of the existence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the independent Ukraine, I could not remember the time when mass-media (especially those which are supported by the state) were loyal towards the UOC. In general, mass media have been focused on the creation of certain bad rep jackets and intrigues, thus raising their ratings on the confrontation. Therefore the UOC became a convenient victim, the object for manipulations. It happened in the past, but now it has gained a tougher character. I can say for sure that one of the central TV channels, such as “1+1” regularly publishes information about the Church life and 99 percent of this information is false [5].

In most cases, the lies remain unpunished; and even the apologies from those who distribute the hate and lies are rare. The constraining mechanisms, which somehow worked before 2014, were largely abandoned after the Revolution of Dignity, which paved the way for certain ideological clichés in relation to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This ideological justification is also conveniently used for more radical actions, such as the intimidation from authorities and the spread of violence. As a testimony to that, from 2014 to 2018 there were around 50 cases of illegal and violent seizures of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s buildings [11].

Misinformation and further division

The path towards autocephaly, reflecting the politisation of religious identities, was accompanied by the proliferation of false and biased information. The parties were misquoting each other; there were attempts to interpret some decisions and declarations in ways, looking more favourable for supporters of autocephaly. In some cases, flawed information was created at the top political levels. For instance, the then Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Rostislav Pavlenko distorted the Polish Orthodox Church’s opinion on the issue, denying the existence of the Church’s call to coordinate granting of autocephaly with all other Orthodox Churches. In fact, this decision, initially taken in Warsaw in May 2018, was further confirmed by the Polish Church in November, at the Bishops’ Council, which clearly stated that a Pan-Orthodox meeting is desirable for the solution of Ukrainian problem [7]. Chairman of Ukrainian Parliament, Andrei Parubiy, after paying his visit to Tbilisi, stated that the Georgian Patriarch expressed his hope “for the positive solution of this issue [autocephaly]”. In reality, the Patriarch did not express any support for autocephaly; his assessment was quite neutral and reserved, he only spoke about the need “to refrain from premature assessments” [8].

Misinterpretations took place even at the level of the Foreign Ministry. The Ukrainian Ambassador in Cyprus, after meeting Archbishop Chrysostomos II, said that the Church of Cyprus supported autocephaly, which was contrary to the information published on the Church’s website [10]. Perspectives of the Catholic Church were also presented in a distorted

way; therefore, the MFA's statement that the Vatican "respects the decision of Ukrainian people regarding the creation of the United Local Church" was immediately corrected by the Apostolic Nunciature in Kiev, which claimed that "the Holy See never did and has no intention whatsoever of expressing any evaluation, in any venue" [1].

It might be possible that some politicians and civil servants were acting in, what they think, were the best interests of Ukraine (at least in the way that they understand them). However, they decided to use the Church to promote these interests, despite the Church and its faithful never having asked for their assistance or their interference. The way that was chosen to promote these interests was obviously not acceptable to a substantial portion of Orthodox believers and was, in fact, harmful to the largest Orthodox Church in Ukraine and its followers. The actions undertaken did not lead to unity in Ukraine; in fact, the opposite appears to be true, as seen from the latest sociological polls. Indeed, in spite of the 37% support for the establishment of the Single Local Orthodox Church [percentage of those who are 'fully supportive' as of September 2018], this idea has failed to turn into an enterprise, which could potentially unite Ukrainians. Arguably, the main cluster of support has formed in the western and central regions of Ukraine. This statistically is seen in the following: in the western Ukraine, 51% of the respondents are fully supportive of the Single Orthodox Church, while in the centre of Ukraine this equals to 39%. This decreases to 27% in the southern Ukrainian regions and to 25% in the eastern. No information is available for Crimea and the parts of Lugansk and Donetsk regions not controlled by the Ukrainian government, but it is likely that in these regions the support for autocephaly will be negligible [9].

Overall, one can observe that attempts to mobilise all-Ukrainian support for religious purposes, as required for politicising and securitising of religious identities, have generally failed. It is now likely that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will be continuously featured as a "radical other"; however, it will equally continue to enjoy the support of a substantial portion of Ukrainians. As a result, the new dividing lines will further alienate people from different regions and different Church jurisdictions in Ukraine, pushing aside the prospects for unity and reconciliation.

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СРЕДСТВА МАССОВОЙ ИНФОРМАЦИИ, ОБЩЕСТВЕННОЕ МНЕНИЕ И СОЗДАНИЕ АВТОКЕФАЛЬНОЙ ПРАВОСЛАВНОЙ ЦЕРКВИ УКРАИНЫ

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В докладе анализируется роль средств массовой информации и общественное мнение в процессе создания в 2018 году автокефальной Православной Церкви Украи-

ны. Провозглашение автокефалии было продиктовано преимущественно политико-идеологическими мотивами и сопровождалось ростом конфронтации. Большинство православных, принадлежащих Украинской православной церкви, не поддержало данный процесс, вследствие чего против верующих УПЦ была развёрнута кампании запугивания. В настоящее время на Украине продолжается процесс конструирования «радикального иного», причём значительные усилия прилагаются к тому, чтобы превратить в «радикального иного» Украинскую православную церковь, представляя её чужеродным образованием на теле украинской государственности. В целом можно отметить, что движение к автокефалии, вместо предполагаемого объединения украинцев, создало на Украине новые разделительные линии и способствовало расколу в мировом православии.